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Abstract
We consider the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance but without the exclusivity constraint. It turns out that there always exists a unique equilibrium,
in which the reliable and unreliable consumers take out a primary insurance
up to its quantity limit, and the unreliable take out further secondary insurance at a higher premium. We provide a simple proof of this result (extended
to multiple types of consumers) with the hope that it may be pedagogically
useful.
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Introduction

Rothschild and Stiglitz ([8]) famously described a model of adverse selection in insurance markets in which …rms could set quantity limits in order to hold down the
number of unreliable clients they might have to face. They assumed that …rms
could demand exclusivity from their clients, and focused attention on a “separating”
equilibrium in which reliable and unreliable clients took out completely di¤erent
contracts. This separating equilibrium often did not exist, but was unique when it
did.
Many di¤erent authors, starting with Jaynes ([7]) and including several others
(see, e.g., [1], [2], [3], [5], [6], and the references therein) considered dropping the
y
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exclusivity constraint in speci…c economic contexts, and pointed to a di¤erent equilibrium in which both types take out a common primary insurance up to its quantity
limit, and then the unreliable take out a further secondary insurance on their own at
higher premium1 . Two recent papers (see Attar et al [3] and Stiglitz et al [9]) show
that this primary-secondary equilibrium always exists and is unique. The model in
[3] is more general than that of Rothschild-Stiglitz (see Remark 5), while in [9] …rms
are permitted to use far more complex strategies than in Rothschild-Stiglitz.
In this paper, we go back to the basic model of Rothschild-Stiglitz, with just one
amendment: contracts o¤ered by …rms are no longer exclusive, so that a consumer
may take out contracts from as many …rms as he likes. In all other respects, our
model is no di¤erent from that of Rothschild-Stiglitz. This enables us to give a simple
proof of the existence and uniqueness of primary-secondary insurance equilibrium
(extended, in a natural manner, to any number of consumer-types, provided they
can be ranked in terms of their reliability), which we hope will be of interest, at least
from the pedagogical standpoint.
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The Model

We describe the simplest model of insurance, in which each consumer begins with an
endowment of one unit of the consumption good in her good (no-accident) state and
nothing in her bad (accident) state. An insurance contract ( ; Q) ; where2 2 R++
and Q 2 R++ ; allows any consumer to choose any non-negative amount z
Q of
insurance, by paying a premium z in both states in order to receive nothing in her
good state and z in her bad state. We suppose a …xed interest rate, for convenience
taken to be 0, so that in her good state the consumer ends up losing z; but gains
on net (1
)z in her bad state. If the consumer has probability p of an accident,
then the insurance is actuarially fair (or, unfair) to her if = p (or, > p):
1

Indeed, we ourselves pointed to this equilibrium (see [4]), albeit in a di¤erent setting, where
perfect competition substituted for free entry. To be precise, all conceivable contracts, most of
which were not actively traded in equilibrium, were priced in [4] by the “invisible hand” of perfect
competition (i.e., by the market forces of supply and demand). In e¤ect, there was not just a
continuum of consumer-clients in [4], but also a continuum of supplier-…rms. There could be no
question of an entrant …rm upsetting the equilibrium, because its actions had no a¤ect on market
supply and it could not even be seen.
2
By quoting exorbitantly high and any Q > 0; a …rm can ensure that no customer will come
to it, and thus can abstain from participating in the market (i.e., the strict positivity of Q does
not force participation). We assume Q > 0 because it makes for a cleaner presentation. (Allowing
Q = 0 would not alter the …nal results, or add any analytical insights, but just necessitate more
notation.)
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Thus a consumer who takes out z
Q units of the insurance contract ( ; Q)
and begins with goods y = (yG ; yB ); will wind up consuming yG
z in her good
state, and yB + (1
)z in her bad state. As z moves from 0 to Q; her consumption
traverses the straight line segment with slope (1
)= from y to y 0 (where y 0 is
obtained by setting z = Q): We denote this segment by y ! ;Q y 0 :
Let S = f( ; Q) : 2 R++ ; Q 2 2 R++ g denote the strategy set of each …rm,
consisting of contracts ( ; Q): Insurance contracts are non-exclusive: each consumer
may choose as many contracts as she wishes.
N
Given a strategy-pro…le = ( n ; Qn )N
of …rms 1; : : : ; N (where N is
n=1 2 S
arbitrary), we de…ne the consumption polygon ( ) as follows. First let 1 ( ) <
th
2( ) < : : : <
L ( ) denote the …rst-lowest, second-lowest, ..., L -lowest values
1
among
; : : : ; N ; let Nl ( )P
= fn 2 N : n = l ( )g be the set of …rms quoting
n
the lth -rate, and let Ql ( ) =
n2Nl ( ) Q be the total quantity o¤ered by them.
2
Then ( ) is the polygonal curve in R+ that starts at y 0 = (1; 0) on the horizontal
axis; goes up …rst by the amount Q1 ( ) at the rate (slope) (1
1 ( ))= 1 ( ); next
by the amount Q2 ( ) at the rate (1
2 ( ))= 2 ( ); and so on, getting truncated
at the point where it hits the vertical axis (if it happens to get that far by the Lth
step). More precisely,
( ) = y0 !

1(

);Q1 ( )

y1 !

2(

);Q2 ( )

y 2 ! ::: !

L(

);QL ( )

yL

Since premiums ` are increasing with `, the polygonal curve is concave.
Let the consumer-types be denoted 1; : : : ; T whose population measures are 1 ; : : : ;
and whose bad states occur with probabilities p1 ; : : : ; pT respectively, with 0 < p1 <
p2 < : : : < pT ; i.e., type 1 is the most “reliable”, and type T is least so. The utility
function of type t is denoted ut : R2+ ! R and is assumed to be continuous, strictly
monotonic, and strictly concave. Furthermore the standard single crossing property
is assumed, i.e., denoting consumptions in the good and bad states by xG and xB
respectively, we have: if t > t0 then, at any point (xG ; xB ) 2 R2+ , the indi¤erence
curve of ut lies strictly below that of ut0 to the left of the point and strictly above it
to the right. A canonical example is given by ut (xG ; xB ) = (1 pt )u(xG ) + pt u(xB )
for some strictly monotonic and strictly concave utility u:
It is clear that
(i) on account of the strict concavity of ut , any consumer of type t will maximize
ut on ( ) at a unique point xt ( ) 2 ( ) (in particular, all consumers of type t
will consume the same bundle);
(ii) on account of the single crossing property, as t increases, xt ( ) will advance
weakly on ( ) further away from the initial endowment (1; 0); more precisely, at
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T;

any level l of ( ); consumer-type t will take out strictly more insurance than the
more reliable type t0 < t, unless both have reached the quantity limit Ql ( ) :
Given a polygon ( ); a consumer of type t who takes out insurance (zt1 ( ); :::; ztL ( ))
at each of the L levels, will end up consuming xt ( ) = (xtG ( ); xtB ( )); where
xtG ( ) = 1

L
X

ztl ( ) ` ( ))

`=1

xtB ( ) =

L
X

ztl ( )(1

`(

))

`=1

It is also clear that
(iii) the consumer will exhaust the better contracts before starting the lesser
contracts, hence z` ( ) > 0 implies that zj ( ) = Qj ( ) for all j < `; and z` ( ) = 0
implies that zj ( ) = 0 for all j > `:
For ease of presentation3 , we suppose that if zt` ( ) < Q` ( ), then the consumer
takes out a pro rata share of the quantities o¤ered on level `; i.e. she takes out the
amount
Qn
ztn ( ) = zt` ( ) P
j
j2Nl ( ) Q
of insurance from each …rm n 2 Nl ( ): It follows that not only is the …nal consumption xt ( ) a deterministic function of ; but so are the amounts ztn ( ) of insurance
that any consumer type t takes out from each …rm n = 1; : : : ; N in order to get to
xt ( ) . Now, recalling that t is the population measure of type t; the pro…t F n ( )
of …rm n is
F n( ) =

n

T
X
t=1

n
t zt ( )

T
X

n
t zt (

)pt = Revenue - Cost

t=1

P
P
It will be useful to speak of the unit cost Tt=1 t ztn ( )pt = Tt=1 t ztn ( ); whenever
the
is positive (i.e. level ` has active consumers), so that pro…t F n ( ) =
PT denominator
n
t=1 t zt ( )[premium - unit cost]. Observe that, by the pro rata rule, every …rm
charging the same premium will incur the same unit cost.
De…nition 1 (Equilibrium).A strategy pro…le = (( 1 ; Q1 ) ; : : : ; N ; QN ) is called
an equilibrium if: (a) no …rm makes a loss, i.e, F n ( )
0 for n = 1; : : : ; N ;
3

And, only for ease of presentation. See Remark 1 for the case where we allow consumers to
choose how much insurance to take out from …rms o¤ering the same rate.
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(b) no entrant …rm N + 1 can make a pro…t, i.e., there is no (entrant) strategy
( N +1 ; QN +1 ) 2 S such that, denoting
= (( 1 ; Q1 ) ; : : : ; N ; QN ; ( N +1 ; QN +1 )),
we have
T
T
X
X
N +1
N +1
N +1
N +1
( )pt > 0
( )
F
( )=
t zt
t zt
t=1

t=1

Theorem 2 (Existence and Uniqueness) There exists an equilibrium, and across
all equilibria the consumptions of the consumers are invariant.
We shall prove this in the next two sections, and give an explicit description of
the unique equilibrium consumptions.

3

Existence of Equilibrium

P
De…nition 3 (Canonical strategy pro…le): Let i = Tl=i l pl ; for i = 1; : : : ; T:
Let Q1 be the amount of insurance that a consumer of type 1 would take out at the
premium 1 if there were no quantity constraints on her. De…ne Qi inductively as
the amount of insurance that a consumer of type t would take out at the premium
i if there were no quantity constraints on her and she had already taken out Q1 at
1 ; Q2 at 2 ; : : : ;and Qi 1 at i 1 . Now take the set of …rms to also be 1; : : : ; T;
i.e., one …rm for each consumer-type; and de…ne
= (( 1 ; Q1 ) ; : : : ; ( T ; QT )) to
be the canonical strategy pro…le. (If Qi = 0; then …rm i is understood to have been
dropped.)
It is worth noting that in the canonical strategy pro…le, the contract ( i ; Qi ) is
not taken out by any type t < i; and is taken out until the quantity limit Qi by all
types t i: Moreover, for each Qi > 0; the premium i is set equal to its unit cost,
so all contracts make zero pro…t.
Lemma 4 The canonical strategy pro…le

is an equilibrium.

Proof. We need only verify that no new …rm has incentive to enter.
Consider a potential entrant. If it quotes premium < 1 , then (by (ii) and (iii))
all types will go to it, taking out nondecreasing amounts insurancePas we descend
the reliability ladder, so that the entrant’s unit cost will be at least Tt=1 t pt = 1 ;
while its premium is strictly less, so it will make a loss. Next if it quotes = i
for any i; then it gets the same mix of customers (by our pro-rata rule) as …rm i
did in ; and therefore makes the same zero pro…t. Finally, if it quotes any with
5

< < i+1 , it will attract only types i + 1; : : : ; T so that its unit cost will be at
P
least Tt=i+1 t pt = i+1 ; while its premium is strictly less, so it will make a loss. If
it quotes > T , it will attract no one and therefore make no pro…t.
i

4

Uniqueness of Equilibrium Consumptions

Lemma 5 Let
be any strategy pro…le at which there is a non-empty set J =
ft : zt` ( ) > 0g of active consumer-types on level l of ( ). Then, for small enough
" > 0; the strategy ( l ( ) "; ") enables an entrant …rm to
P come in and earn the
premium l ( ) " while incurring unit cost no more than t2J t pt ; which in turn
is no more than the common unit cost c of each active …rm in at level `: Furthermore, if J has at least two consumer types, and if the most reliable consumer in J is
not taking out the
P full quantity Q` ( ) of insurance at level `; then the entrant’s unit
cost is at most t2J t pt < c for all small enough ":

Proof. Denote by " = ( ; ( ("); ")) the polygon formed after the entry, where
(") = l ( ) ": As " ! 0; the polygon " coverges to ( ): Hence, by (i), each
consumer-type’s optimal choice on " converges to her optimal choice in ( ): Since
all the types in J take out positive insurance at premium l ( ) in ( ); they must be
doing so in " (for small enough "): However no one takes out insurance at premium
l ( ) in
" before exhausting possibilities at the lower premium (") available in
":
Hence all the consumer-types in J take out the same insurance up to the available
limit " at premium
P (") in " : This implies that the unit cost incurred by the
entrant from J is t2J t pt : On the other hand, invoking (ii), thePreliabilty mix of
consumer types at level ` of ( ) is no better than at ("); thus t2J t pt c: In
addition, there may be some other consumer-types J 0 who also simultaneously take
out insurance at premium (") in " but then everyone in J 0 must be more reliable
than the most reliable in J: This further lowers the unit cost of the entrant and the
desired conclusion hold with even more force. Finally, if the most reliable consumer
j in J was not taking out full insurance in and other consumers are present in J;
then (again by (ii)) these others strictly worsen
Pthe reliability mix in at premium
(
);
compared
to
the
mix
at
(");
implying
l
t2J t pt < c:

Lemma 6 At any equilibrium, all …rms make zero pro…ts.

Proof. Any …rm i making a positive pro…t must have unit cost strictly below its
premium. By Lemma 5, an entrant can charge an arbitrarily smaller premium and
yet incur no higher unit cost, thus making a pro…t and contradicting equilibrium.
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Lemma 7 At any equilibrium, all consumptions are the same as in the canonical
strategy pro…le :
Proof. Let be any equilibrium. We shall show inductively that all consumertypes t = 1; : : : ; T consume the same in as in ; starting with type 1:
Assume that 1 < T . (The case 1 = T will be considered later.) We claim that
(a consumer of type) 1 takes out no insurance in if, and only if, she takes out
no insurance in : For suppose she takes out positive insurance in
but none in
: This implies that the premium 1 ( ) > 1 ( )
1 : Let an entrant come in
at and o¤er ( 1 + "; ") : For small enough "; it follows from (i) and (ii), that all
types will take this contract up to the limit "; so that the unit cost of the entrant is
P
T
1 which is strictly less than its premium, so that the entrant makes a
t=1 t pt
pro…t, a contradiction. Conversely suppose that type 1 takes out positive insurance
in but none in P
: Then 1 ( ) < 1 : However, by (ii), the unit cost of …rms quoting
T
(
)
is
at
least
1
1 ; which is more than the premium 1 ( ) they are
t=1 t pt
charging, hence these incumbent …rms make losses at , again a contradiction. This
veri…es our claim.
In view of the claim, it remains to consider the case where 1 takes out positive
insurance in both and : We shall establish that 1 ( ) = 1 and that all of Q1 ( )
is taken out by 1, and that 1 does not proceed further onto the second level of ( ).
Suppose that 1 takes out less than the full quantity Q1 ( ) at premium 1 ( ).
Then, recalling 1 < T , other less reliable consumer-types exist and, by (ii), these
types take out strictly more insurance as 1 at 1 ( ) : So Lemma 5 can be applied,
which shows that an entrant can charge an arbitrarily smaller premium than 1 ( ),
and yet incur unit cost bounded strictly below c, thus making a pro…t (since, by the
de…nitiion of equilibrium, incumbent …rms N1 ( ) at level 1 in , whose unit costs
were c; made no losses in the equilibrium prior to his entry), and contradicting
that is an equilibrium. Thus 1 takes out Q1 ( ) units P
of insurance. Then, by
(ii), so do all other types; and the unit cost at level 1 of is Tt=1 t pt : By Lemma 6,
PT
1( ) =
1:
t=1 t pt
Next suppose that 1 wants to take out more insurance than Q1 ( ) at premium
:
1 Let an entrant come in and o¤er ( 1 + "; "). For small enough "; all types will
take out full insurance (post-entry) on the …rst level 1 ( ) and furthermore, by (ii)
and the fact that 1 + " < 2P
( ); full insurance also from the entrant. The entrant
will therefore incur unit cost Tt=1 t pt
1 ; but earn the premium 1 + ", making
a pro…t, a contradiction. This proves that Q1 ( ) = Q1 :
Finally we turn to the case that 1 = T; i.e., 1 is the solo type taking out insurance
at : By Lemma 6, 1 ( ) = 1 p1
1 : Clearly 1 will not take out more insurance
7

than Q1 : If he takes out less (because less is o¤ered, i.e., Q1 ( ) < Q1 ) , an entrant
can come in and o¤er ( 1 + "; ") ; get full subscription, with premium 1 +" exceeding
unit cost 1 p1 ; and thus making a pro…t, a contradiction.
Now suppose, inductively, that i ( ) = i and Qi ( ) = Qi for types types i =
1; : : : ; l and consider type l+1 < L. Repeat the argument given above, replacing type
1; : : : ; T by types l + 1; : : : ; T ( i.e., just drop the types 1; : : : ; l from the picture and
commence with type l + 1 looking “ahead”on ( )) to conclude that l+1 ( ) = l+1
and Ql+1 ( ) = Ql+1 .

5

Remarks

(1) (Beyond the Pro-Rata Rule)
a consumer is indi¤erent between several
P When
i
i
…rms ( ; Q )i2I , and wants z < i2I Q units of insurance at the common premium
quoted by them, we could let the consumer choose how much insurance to take
out from
P the di¤erent …rms, instead of stipulating the pro rata rule that he take out
Qj = i2I Qi z from j 2 I. This would be tantamount to allowing the distribution of
z among I to be arbitrary (subject to the upper bounds Qi ):However, in this case, we
shall need to be careful in delineating the expectations that an entrant may entertain
regarding the consumer-types it can attract. If its expectations are allowed to be
too optimistic, in particular if it can cherry-pick amongst all those customers who
like its contract at least as much as their current ones, then equilibrium will fail to
exist. Some tempering of its optimism is needed in order to uphold equilibrium. One
natural constraint is that the entrant should expect to get precisely those customers
who strictly bene…t by coming to it, i.e., it cannot cherry pick amongst them, but
must accomodate all. At the same time impose the additional constraint that, on
account of an implicit “cost of moving”, those customers who are indi¤erent between
the entrant and their current insurers will stay where they are. With this de…nition,
all our results remain intact by the same arguments (with the obvious changes). The
entrant could even turn pessimistic and make the assumption that, amongst those
indi¤erent to it, only the most unreliable ones will present themselves at its door
(alongside, of course, all those who strictly bene…t). This, too, will leave our results
intact.
(2) (Pretending to be Many Firms, i.e. Menus) We can allow each (incumbent or entrant) …rm to issue as many elementary contracts ( ; Q) as it likes, i.e., aln
low its strategy set to be [1
n=1 S : This will not alter equilibrium. To see this, consider
a …rm that issues ( 1 ; Q1 ); : : : ; ( m ; Qm ) with 1 < : : : < m as part of a strategy pro…le : Let the …rm unilaterally withdraw any one of its contracts ( j ; Qj ) : A moment’s
relection reveals that the clientale it will get at ( 1 ; Q1 ); : : : ; ( j 1 ; Qj 1 ) will remain
8

una¤ected, while the reliability mix of the clientale it will get at ( j+1 ; Qj+1 ); : : : ; ( m ; Qm )
will not worsen, thus not worsening the pro…tability of every remaining contract. We
conclude that an entrant can make a pro…t via a menu only if it can make a pro…t
via a single contract. Moreover, if an incumbent makes a negative pro…t on one of its
contracts, then it must make a positive pro…t on another one of its contracts (since it
cannot make losses in equilibrium). But then by our standard argument, an entrant
can come and make a positive pro…t as well.
(3) (Mixing Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Contracts Destroys Equilibrium): Suppose, for simplicity, that there are just two consumer-types. An entrant
…rm can always break our primary-secondary equilibrium
by the strategem of
issuing an exclusive contract that will lure only the reliable and enable them to consume above their -level. (The unreliable are kept at bay, because the quantity
limit of the entrant is too restrictive for them). Moreover, as may be readily veri…ed,
the entrant’s premium in this stratagem can be set higher than 1 p1 + 2 p2 ; hence
it will make a pro…t. Conversely the separating equilibrium 0 of [8] can be broken
whenever the consumption of the reliable at
is better than her consumption at 0 :
For, in this case, an entrant can intervene in 0 with the o¤er of the same quantity
as the primary contract of
and a premium that is slightly higher, get both types
to fully subscribe to it and thereby make a pro…t.
(4) (Welfare Comparisons) Clearly the unreliable are always better o¤ at
the primary-secondary equilibrium
than at the separating equilibrium 0 : If the
reliable are su¢ ciently numerous compared to the unreliable, then it is easy to see
that they too will prefer
to 0 ; with the upshot that
Pareto-dominates 0 : On
the other hand, if the unreliable constitute the bulk of the population, one can still
say that
dominates 0 from the “majoritarian”point-of-view.
(5) (General Adverse Selection with Ranked Consumers) The arguments
we have given do not depend on the particulars of the underlying insurance market.
Let us suppose that …rms sell quantities of a commodity to consumers. Firm n sets
a price n and a quantity limit Qn : Consumers can buy from as many …rms as they
want, up to the prescribed quantity limits. What is essential for our analysis to
remain intact is that the consumer types can be ranked in the same order 1; :::; T
in two senses. First, given any vector of …rm o¤ers, the quantities purchased at any
price are weakly increasing in consumer type t; (and strictly increasing if the total
quantity limit available at the price is not exhausted). Second, we need to suppose
that the constant marginal cost ct of producing the good for type is also increasing
in t: See [3] for an excellent analysis, carried out in this general framework.
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